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Crofton: There is No Free Lunch

FROM A DEFENSE ATTORNEY'S
PERSPECTIVE: "THERE IS NO FREE LUNCH"
Hon. George C. Pratt:
Our next section will include attorney Michael Crofton, followed by Professor Oscar Gray.
Michael Crofton, Esq.*:
Thank you very much. Let me state from the outset that I am
an attorney in practice. I am not an academic, unlike many of the
learned people here today. I am essentially a trial lawyer, which
means that I spend a lot of my time in court in front of juries or
talking to my clients about problems that face them. My clients
are generally defendants in products liability cases. They include
insurance companies and manufacturers. When I say manufacturers, I do not only mean major manufacturers. Although these
certainly are some of our clients, we also represent smaller businesses that manufacture products which lead to litigation. So
from that point of view, I think you should understand that what I
say comes from a defense perspective, as quite obviously others
here today may speak more from a plaintiff's perspective.
I came to this country seven years ago and I understood it to be
the land of opportunity. 1 But attached to the land of opportunity
is a very important caveat which I think Mr. Vargo, who spoke
earlier, 2 and indeed many plaintiffs' lawyers, and unfortunately
plaintiffs themselves, seem to forget. There are other important

* Attorney practicing with the firm of Katten, Muchin & Zavis in New

York City; B.A. (1973), LL.B. (1976), University of Natal, Durban, South
Africa. He specializes in aviation insurance law.
1. Mr. Crofton is originally from Durban, South Africa.
2. See John F. Vargo, Caveat Emptor: Will the A.L.L Erode Strict
Liability in The Restatement (Third) for Products Liability?, 10 TouRo L.
REV. 21 (1993).
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phrases in the American culture: "There is no free lunch," 3 and
4
"You get what you pay for. "
Law is a political exercise. A society determines the level to
which it will inoculate its people against harm. The law is the
vehicle through which those decisions are made. So if we, in the
United States, believe that people should recover for their injuries
under any circumstance, that is fine; and may I say that is fine
with my clients too. I represent insurance companies and manufacturers, and provided that, in advance of the harm occurring,
society has made the determination that everyone will recover for
an unknowable or undiscoverable risk which subsequently causes
harm, manufacturers can price their products accordingly. In
addition, through actuarial means, insurers can evaluate that risk
in advance. The price of that assessment, and the societal cost of
the decision to protect citizens, will be built into the product and
the insurance prospectively. In other words, in applying this approach, every product sold from today going forward would have
an element of cost within it which will reflect the decision of society.
However, where fairness deserts us, and what I think Mr.
Vargo seems to forget, is that in many circumstances, products
which were put on the market years ago, and the insurance policies to cover them, made no allowance, nor could they, for expansions in liability and coverage which modem courts and lawyers seem to favor. 5 Therefore, you have situations arising today
3. The proverb implies that you cannot get something for nothing.
Theories as to the origin of this quote range from a colloquial axiom in United
States economics now in general use, to an Italian immigrant with a shoe-shine
box outside Grand Central Station in New York City. See SIMON JAMES &
ROBERT PARKER, A DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS QUOTATIONS 51 (1991); J.A.
SIMPSON, THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PROVERBS 87 (1982).
4. This quotation is attributed to Gabriel Biel and can be found in
Expositio Canonis Missae, lectio. See JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONS 150 (15th ed. 1980).
5. See TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, AN UPDATE ON THE LIABILITY
CRISIS 54 (1987) ("The recent expansion of tort liability doctrines has been
one of the most dramatic and far-reaching developments in modem American
law .... The most active and visible area of expanding tort liability has been

that of product liability."); Mark M. Hager, Civil Compensation and its
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where, for example, asbestos manufacturers have gone out of
business or have been declared bankrupt. 6 Similarly, insurance
companies have gone out of business or have been bankrupted.
Lloyd's of London, 7 for example, has been severely threatened
by the problem of the unknowable risk, 8 and has been severely
Discontents: A Response to Huber, 42 STAN. L. REV. 539, 572 (1989)
(reviewing PETER W. HUBER, LIABILrrY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND rrs
CONSEQUENCES (1988)) ("Modem tort law has attempted to make life safer by
an expanded imposition of liability on the pursuers of harm-causing activities
and the makers of harm-causing things."); George L. Priest, The Current
Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1525 (1987)
("The expansion of liability since the mid-1960's has been chiefly motivated
by concern of our courts to provide insurance to victims who have suffered
personal injury.").
6. See Robert Rice, Reinsurers Reeling from Red-Line Entries, FIN.
TIMES, Oct. 15, 1993, at 6 ("Giant U.S. corporations such as John Manville
[sic], the asbestos manufacturer, and A.H. Robins, the pharmaceutical group,
had been forced into Chapter 11 protection and insurers and reinsurers around
the world were 'reeling from red-line entries.'"); see, e.g., In re Joint E. and
S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992) (class action
beneficiaries seeking revision of obligations and payment procedures under
trust created pursuant to the confirmed Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan filed by the
Johns-Manville Corporation, the world's largest manufacturer of asbestos);
Willis v. Celotex Co., 978 F.2d 146, 147 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 1846 (1993) (concluding that stay of proceedings against third-party
sureties to enforce payment on bonds by the bankruptcy court was proper
based on the facts of Celotex Corporation's Chapter 11 bankruptcy under 11
U.S.C.A. § 105(a)); UNR Indus., Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 942 F.2d
1101, 1103 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1586 (1992) (reversing
dismissal of UNR claims against two insurers based on District Court's failure
to take adequate account of asbestos manufacturer UNR's bankruptcy
reorganization).
7. See Eugene Robinson, At Lloyd's, Disaster Hits Home: London
Insurer Undertakes Reforms in Wake of Losses, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 1992, at
B10. Lloyd's of London is an insurance institution where approximately 1,300
investors join one of hundreds of investor syndicates, which make individual
decisions as to whether to insure all or part of a certain risk. Each investor
then shares in the profits and losses of their individual syndicate. Individual
liability for the losses incurred by an investor's syndicate is unlimited. Id.; see
also RAYMOND FLOWER & MICHAEL WYNN JONES, LLOYD'S OF LONDON: AN
ILLUSTRATED HISTORY (1974).

8. See G. Bruce Knecht, Beleaguered Lloyd's: Famed British Insurer is
Fightingfor Survival, BARRONS, June 1, 1992, at 15 ("[U]nlimited liability-
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penalized because society, particularly American society, has
shifted the goal posts during the game. Now, burdens of liability
and coverage are imposed long after the price of the product and
the insurance was agreed and paid.

So this is where fairness comes in. Should manufacturers and
insurers be required to provide American society with a "free
lunch?" It is easy to present a sympathetic case about an individual consumer, and of course there are often tragic situations
where individual consumers are harmed and may not recover
compensation. However, if Americans feel strongly about these
cases, we as a society have got an obvious solution. We can step
forward and say, "We will take care of that person, today, as
taxpayers. " 9 Plaintiffs' lawyers like Mr. Vargo, and indeed
historically one of the organization's chief attractions for clients--probably will
become a relic of the past."); John Moore, Posgate Callsfor End to Lloyd's
Principle of Unlimited Liability, INDEPENDENT, Sept. 24, 1991, at 22
("Lloyd's and its underwriting members have been hit by more than one
billion pounds of losses and an internal task force is considering whether
unlimited liability is an appropriate mechanism to underpin Lloyd's insurance
policies."); Robinson, supra note 7, at B0 ("Multibillion-dollar losses--$4
billion worth of red ink in 1989 alone--have spurred rebellion among investors
and forced the embattled Lloyd's management team to cobble together a
program of reforms.").
In the wake of $9 billion in losses over the last three years, Lloyd's recently
announced that its members have approved a proposal which permits
"institutions, other insurers and corporations to invest for the first time in
underwriting policies. . . ." Richard W. Stevenson, Losses ForceLloyd's into
New Funding, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 21, 1993, at Dl. Until now, Lloyd's capital
had been solely supplied by individual investors. Id.
9. Some commentators have suggested that there are three ways that a
society can offset the cost of tort recovery: through individual insurance
purchased by "potential victims (or their employers)"; through a form of
"social welfare" by government taxation; or by requiring manufacturers to
absorb the loss themselves, which eventually passes the loss on to the
consumer. See David G. Owen, Moral Foundations of Products Liability, 68
NOTRE DAmE L. REv. 427, 487 (1992); see generally Gary T. Schwartz, The
Ethics and The Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REV.
313, 313-14 (1990) (discussing the use of liability insurance to compensate tort
victims and its relationship to the "fairness and deterrence objectives" of tort
law); Robert Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 555,
558 (1985). Sugarman proposes the following reforms for the current tort
compensation system:
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61

plaintiffs themselves, say that we should not ask that price to be
paid by all the citizens of the United States. Instead, they want to
place the cost only on certain individuals or taxpayers, such as
manufacturers and insurance companies. 10
(1) eliminate tort remedies for accidental injuries; (2) build on existing
social insurance and employee benefit plans to assure compensation to
accident victims in line with compensation provided for other major
causes of income loss and medical expense; and (3) build on existing
regulatory schemes both to promote accident avoidance and to provide
outlets for complaints about unreasonably dangerous conduct.
Id. Courts have also urged change in the current law of product liability, see,
e.g., Nichols v. Union Underwear Co., 602 S.W.2d 429, 432 n.1 (Ky. 1980):
It seems to us that the entire field of product liability law is especially
fertile for comprehensive legislative review and action. Its rows need to
be stably defined by legislative survey of the socioeconomic policies
which determine its contours. Additionally, uniformity of law among all
the states may be desirable because product liability insurance rates are
set on a countrywide basis. Thus, the current system of having
individual state courts develop product liability law on a case-to-case
basis is not consistent with commercial necessity. Uniformity and
stability in this area are desirable if product liability insurance rates are
to be stabilized at reasonable levels.
Id.
10. See Richard C. Ausness, Cigarette Company Liability: Preemption,
PublicPolicy, and Alternative Compensation Systems, 39 SYRACUSE L. REv.
897, 940 (1988) (stating that manufacturers are "appropriate loss-spreaders"
and losses incurred by consumers injured by defective products should be
absorbed by manufacturers who benefit from the presence of the product in the
market); Alfred W. Cortese, Jr. & Kathleen L. Blaner, The Anti-Competitive
Impact of U.S. Product Liability Laws: Are ForeignBusinesses Beating Us at
Our Own Game?, 9 J. L. & COM. 167, 175 (1989) (noting that the theory of
strict liability itself presumes that "the corporations making and selling a
product are in the best position to insure against the risk of injury from the
product"); Diane B. Lawrence, Strict Liability, Computer Software and
Medicine: PublicPolicy at the Crossroads,23 TORT & INS. L.J. 1, 11 (1987):
Courts impose strict liability in defective product transactions for the
following reasons: 1) the manufacturer, due to his superior knowledge,
is in the best position to prevent, discover, and eliminate defects, thus
he should pay for damages inflicted by a defective product; 2) the
manufacturer places the product in the stream of commerce and the
consumer relies on the skill, care, and reputation of the manufacturer
that the product is safe to use; 3) the manufacturer is in a better position
than the consumer to absorb and spread the risk or cost of injuries
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These are the political and economic realities, and I think we
should not forget them. I would not mind, as a representative of

insurers or manufacturers, if we had a strict liability standard for
design defect1 1 or failure to warn. 12 That is fine. But let us do it
prospectively, so that every product that goes out the door from
today can be evaluated on that basis. The consumer will ultimately pay for protecting against those risks. Mr. Vargo raised
the question of shifting the risk, and said we were only looking at
half the problem because, while the manufacturer may pay in
some circumstances, the individual consumer may have to bear
the cost in other circumstances. 13 But what is wrong with that?
Economic reality is that ultimately, the consumer always pays.
through insurance or increased prices; and 4) the consumer should not
be prevented from recovery due to the burdensome requirements of
tracing a particular item through the distribution and production systems
to the source of the defect.
Id.; Ellen Wertheimer, Unknowable Dangers and the Death of Strict Product
Liability: The Empire Strikes Back, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 1183, 1215 (1992)
("If the manufacturer is not liable, the cost will fall on the injured consumer.
Surely this is more inequitable than placing the cost on the party responsible
for putting the product on the market.").
11. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 99, at 698-99 (5th ed. 1984). A product is defective in design when it
is "unreasonably dangerous in relation to design hazards." Id. at 698. Two
different tests are utilized in determining design hazards. The first is the
consumer-contemplation test. Under this test, a product is dangerously
defective if it is "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchased it with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community as to the product's characteristics." Id.
Under the second test, risk-utility, a product is dangerously defective if "the
magnitude of the danger outweighs the utility of the product." Id. at 699. This
is based on the idea that all products have both benefits and risks, and the only
way to evaluate the design danger is to weigh the danger against the utility. Id.
12. Id. at 685.
A manufacturer or other seller is subject to liability for failing either to
warn or adequately to warn about a risk or hazard inherent in the way a
product is designed that is related to the intended uses as well as the
reasonably foreseeable uses that may be made of the products it sells.
Id. The hope is that adequate warnings on products will reduce risk and protect
"individual autonomy in decision-making." Id.
13. See Vargo, supra note 2, at 32-33.
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That is not unfair. That is the way the society works. We all pay
taxes.
During the last presidential election, Bill Clinton went forward
on the slogan, "It's the economy, stupid." 14 When people in his
campaign started talking about other issues, such as social issues

of less concern to the person in the street or to the average taxpayer or voter, his campaign workers were forced to come back
to the essential issue, "It's the economy, stupid." But what was
the problem? The problem was that America had for many years
gone forward without paying the bill. 15 It had been borrowing

against the future. 16 This is analogous to what Mr. Vargo may be
trying to suggest be done today. However, if we are going to pay

the bill for increased liability provisions in favor of consumers,
we should start paying for them starting today. If we expand the

right of a plaintiff to recover, we, as consumers, not just as
manufacturers, should start paying the bill from here on in. Ob-

17
viously, expanded rights of recovery in tort cost something.

14. See David S. Broder, Clinton's Wobbly Base, WASH. POST, Aug. 22,
1993, at C7. This quote is attributed to President Clinton's top campaign
consultant, James Carville.
15. See Dbnald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, The End of the American
Dream, ST. PErERSBURG TINm, Apr. 5, 1992, at ID; Sam Hodges, Debt
Dwarfs Deficit, PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 21, 1993, at 1C. As of Monday,
September 30, 1992, the United States government had operated on a deficit
for the 23rd consecutive year. This is the longest period in United States
history. The previous record of 16 years consecutively ran from 1931 to 1946,
the years encompassing the Great Depression and World War II.
16. See DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 164, at D-11 (Aug. 26, 1993).
Current estimates for the deficit include a $285 billion forecast for 1993 and a
$300 billion forecast for 1994.
17. See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Wat Liability Crisis? An
Alternative Explanationfor Recent Events in Products Liability, 8 YALE J. ON
REG. 1, 9 (1991) (noting one side effect of expanded tort recovery is increased
manufacturer investment in making products safer, which drives up the cost of
prices to the consumer); George L. Priest, Can Absolute Manufacturer
Liability Be Defended?, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 237, 239 (1992) ("[1In recent
years the expansion of tort liability has made it unprofitable to produce or
offer various types of manufacturing equipment, consumer goods and
consumer services, all of which, as a consequence, have been withdrawn from
markets."); Owen, supra note 9, at 286 n.255 (noting that requiring
manufacturers to absorb the cost of tort liability eventually passes the burden
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"There is no free lunch." Regrettably, this is too often forgotten
or simply hidden from the public by a strategy of adversarial consumerism, with "we" being the "little guy" consumer, and
"they" being the heartless manufacturers and insurance companies.
I would like to move on to another two aspects of today's discussion which affect us as defense lawyers. I am delighted that an
attempt is being made to reform section 402A. 18 As to the
precise form the revision is going to take, I was somewhat
disturbed to read the Cornell Law Review article 19 because I felt
that it had tracked the approach taken in the original section
402A. 20 This approach was to have a very short black letter
section followed by numerous comments. 2 1 What, in effect,
happened over the next couple of decades was that courts took the

on to the consumer "[i]n the form of higher prices and diminished availability
of the product").
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides in
pertinent part:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer

(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and

(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it was sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and

(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
Id.
19. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed
Revision of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 1512 (1992).

20. See supra note 18.
21. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 19, at 1514-26 (outlining the
proposed revision and accompanying comments).
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numerous comments and turned them into black letter law. 2 2

However, if you go back to 402A and read it in its original
context and according to its original intention, I think the
comments were intended to do no more than elucidate a
principle. They were not intended to be black letter law. 23 To my
delight, in talking to Professor Henderson, he told me the
approach to be taken with the latest revision is to spell out in
more detail the "black letter law" and to break it out into many
more sections than was previously the case. From a defense
22. See Myron J. Bromberg, The Mischief of the Strict Liability Label in
the Law of Warnings, 17 SErON HALL L. REV. 526, 527 (1987) ("The
comments are accepted as so integral to the black letter rule of § 402A that
they are commonly treated as part of that rule."); see, e.g., Hartman v. Miller
Hydro Co., 499 F.2d 191, 194 (10th Cir. 1974) (relying on Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 402A comment i to conclude that an assistant production
manager of safety had sufficient knowledge and should have realized that an
exposed revolving shaft was dangerous); Brown v. Abbot Lab., 751 P.2d 470,
477 (Cal. 1988) (interpreting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment
k to be applicable to evaluating a drug manufacturers' liability for all
prescription drugs); Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. McGuire, 814 S.W.2d 385, 38788 (Tex. 1991) (relying on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comments i
and j to conclude Seagrams had no duty to warn that excessive consumption of
alcoholic beverages caused alcoholism because such information was common
knowledge); Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 95 (Utah 1991) (relying
on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment k to exempt from strict
liability manufacturers of drugs which are unavoidably dangerous); Vincer v.
Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 230 N.W.2d 794, 79899 (Wis. 1975) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment i to
conclude that the absence of self-latching gate to a swimming pool was so
obvious that it precluded finding swimming pool manufacturer liable).
23. See Joseph A. Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against
Comment k and for Strict Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853, 857 (1983)
("[S]ection 402A of the Restatement and its comments provide little guidance
in deciding cases that involve generic risks and should not be accorded
dispositive weight in product liability suits."). Many courts have refused to
treat the comments as black letter law; see, e.g., Riley v. American Honda
Motor Co., 856 P.2d 196, 200 (Mont. 1993) ("Our adoption of Restatement
(Second) of Torts [section] 402A was not a wholesale adoption of the
comments accompanying that provision.... ."); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342
N.W.2d 37, 52 (Wis.) ("Although we adopted [section] 402A . . . we
specifically declined to accept or reject any of the comments."), cert. denied
sub nom., E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Collins, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
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standpoint, I think this is going to be a tremendously useful
thing. The reason is that, and I come back to what I said before,
as defendants in these lawsuits, insurers are not averse to risk. If
you ask an insurer or underwriter, "Do you like risk or do you
not like risk?" he will not really take a view. He will say, "Tell
me the risk and I will price it. The more risk, the more money I
will make." I know, for example, in the aviation industry, that as
airlines have become safer over the years, premiums have
plummeted. 24 This is bad for the insurance market. 25 Economically speaking, insurers might do better if planes were going
down all the time so that airlines would pay more in premiums.
In other words, insurance companies are not necessarily risk
averse, they are surprise averse. 2 6 They do not want to be sur-

prised in the year 2010 by a court's ruling which creates a risk,
or interprets a policy to extend coverage, 27 that the insurer did
not build into the premium today. That is a very sensible approach. Of course, interlocking with this are the interests of the
24. See generally David Warsh, Fearof Flying Is Not Justified, New Study
Says, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 20, 1988, at 73 (suggesting that after deregulation

of airlines in 1978, airline safety has improved, resulting in decreased
premiums for liability and hull insurance).
25. See generally Dallas Morning News, Airline Insurance Rates Take A
Surprising Drop, CH. TRIB., May 29, 1988, at 10B (noting that as airline
insurance premiums continue to drop, insurance companies are less profitable
and approach "the break-even point").
26. See generally Richard C. Ausness, Unavoidably Unsafe Products and

Strict Liability: What Liability Rule Should be Applied to the Sellers of
PharmaceuticalProducts?, 78 KY. L.J. 705, 761 (1990) ("insurers may be

unwilling to insure against such liability arising out of undiscovered product
risks"); James A. Henderson, Jr., Coping with the Time Dimension in
Products Liability, 69 CAL. L. REv. 919, 949 (1981) ("[O]ne problem with

justifying liability for unknown hazards on notions of loss spreading is the
assumption that defendants will be able to insure or to survive without
insurance. It is doubtful that liability for unknown risks could adequately be
insured against.").
27. See American Home Prods. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 565 F.
Supp. 1485, 1510 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("The expanded notions of liability to
which courts have pointed in construing [insurance] policy language are
entirely the product of conceptions formulated and rulings made years after the
language at issue had been promulgated."), aff'd, 748 F.2d 760 (2d Cir.

1984).
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consumer in getting a safe product today, and we should not stop

trying to advance safety and simply choose to rely on insurance
to pay all the costs associated with all the injuries that come
about. Some sort of balance needs to be struck.
When it comes to reformulating today, or in the next year or
two, section 402A, as long as the language is precise, I, as a trial
lawyer, would be delighted. I do not want to advise my client as
to what the law is in March of 1993 and then three years down
the road have a judge tell me, "Well, in fact, that is not the law,
I have decided that the law is something else." We cannot settle
cases that way. As a practicing lawyer you prefer to have precision. There is, of course, a price to be paid for precision, as
Professor Twerski indicated. 28 However, when I canvassed a
number of lawyers about today's seminar, including some far
more prominent than myself in the area of products liability law,
the approach they all suggested was basically the same: "Let us
just make the law clear."
One of the reasons that lawyers would like to make the law
clearer than it is, and more precise than it is, is that issues could
then be decided more often by judges than juries. This is an
anathema to Mr. Vargo. I know that he loves juries. However, I
canvassed numerous attorneys in my office and in other offices,
and I concede that none of them were plaintiffs' lawyers - and I
said, "Do you have any faith in a jury looking at complex questions of products liability law, and not only questions of law but
factual questions, and coming to the right decision?" One-hundred percent of the lawyers in this completely unscientific survey
said, "I have no faith in the jury doing that." I similarly have no
faith in the ability of a jury to accurately and objectively assess
the complex issues that come up in these cases. 2 9 I do not suggest
for a moment that it is politically possible to do away with juries.
28. Aaron D. Twerski, From A Reporter: A Prospective Agenda, 10
TouRo L. RE,. 5, 19 (1993) (stating that lawyers may not like precision or
clarity in this area of law, since it prevents them from legal maneuvering).
29. See Joe S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues:
Lessons From Civil Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 727 (1990) (addressing
concerns about a jury's ability to comprehend complex civil litigation and
proposing techniques to ameliorate those concerns).
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However, what one can do is create law that is clear enough so
that it gives judges the confidence to make decisions about facts
that are not in dispute.
In warning cases, 30 I have been in situations where the injured
party actually concedes, in a deposition, that he read and understood the warning and he nevertheless was injured by the very
danger or mode of operation that the warning label warned him
of. Yet on summary judgment, when one goes to the court and
says "we must strike the claim based on failure to warn because
this guy was properly warned," judges inevitably will pass the
ball. When I say inevitably, that is maybe too strong. They will
look for opportunities to pass the ball to the jury. 3 1 I would like
to see judges decide more cases, and if they decide more cases on
this basis in favor of the plaintiff, so be it. But what we do not
like is to be forced to go to trial where facts essentially are not in
dispute, but nevertheless the court tosses the ball to the jury.
As to what one can do about the jury system in the United
States, I am not too sure. What I do know is that as presently
practiced in some state jurisdictions, 32 and less so in the federal

30. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 11, at 685.

31. See, e.g., Deines v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 755 F. Supp. 350, 353 (D.
Kan. 1990) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment even though it
had placed warnings on its hay baler, stating that it is the role of the jury to
evaluate whether the warnings displayed by the defendant were adequate);
Rinehart v. International Playtex, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 475, 477 (S.D. Ind.

1988) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment on the issue of
adequacy of the warnings on defendant's tampon box and package insert
because the determination of adequacy is a question of fact to be decided by
the jury); Sanderson v. Upjohn Co., 578 F. Supp. 338, 340 (D. Mass. 1984)

(denying Upjohn's motion for summary judgment even though the plaintiff's
physicians were warned of the reported side-effects of the drug, stating that the
general rule is that "adequacy of warning questions" are for the jury).
32. See Tracey L. Treger, One Jury Indivisible: A Group Dynamics

Approach to Voir Dire, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 549, 555 (1992). While the
majority of state courts do not allow attorney oral participation in the
questioning of prospective jurors, many states do permit such participation;
see, e.g., DAVID D. SIEGEL, PRACTICE COMMENTARIES to N. Y. CIV. PRAC.

L. & R. § 4107 (McKinney 1992) (stating that it is the practice of New York
courts for attorneys to conduct the voir dire of prospective jurors).
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courts, 33 jury selection is an exercise in what I call applied bigotry. 34 We take a view, we take a practical view, as to whether
or not particular individuals before us would be sympathetic to a
right of recovery for this plaintiff. This is the reality. This is

33. FED. R. CIv. P. 47(a). Rule 47(a) provides:
The court may permit the parties or their attorneys to conduct the
examination of prospectivejurors or may itself conduct the examination.
In the latter event, the court shall permit the parties or their attorneys to
supplement the examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper
or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors such additional questions
by the parties or their attorneys as it deems proper.
Id. However, the majority of federal judges conduct the voir dire without the
oral participation of attorneys. See Rhonda McMillion, Advocating Voir Dire
Reform, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1991, at 114 (stating that few federal judges permit
lawyers to question prospective jurors directly); Treger, supra note 32, at 555;
Otto G. Obermaier, Judge Conducted Voir Dire, in PRACCING LAW
INsTrTuTE, THE JURY 1987: TECHNIQUES FOR THE TRIAL LAWYER 151, 154
(1987) (noting a 1977 survey that showed that although it is the practice of the
New York state courts to permit attorneys to conduct the voir dire, 87 % of the
federal judges sitting in New York conduct their own voir dire without oral
attorney participation).
34. See Treger, supra note 32, at 560-61 (noting that under the
"adversarial view, the goal of voir dire is to impanel a jury with a favorable
attitude toward the client's case, although the statutory purpose of voir dire is
to select fair and impartial jurors."); see also Solomon M. Fulero & Steven D.
Penrod, The Myths and Realities of Attorney Jury Selection Folklore and
Scientific Jury Selection: What Works?, 17 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 229, 230
(1990) (noting that the search for methods to select a favorable jury have led to
an enormous increase in the publishing of information to help litigators in the
jury selection process); Reid Hastie, Is Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire an
Effective Procedurefor the Selection of ImpartialJuries?, 40 AM. U. L. REv.
703, 722 (1991) (concluding "that attorney-conducted voir dire is not an
effective procedure for selection of impartial juries."); Paul N. Luvera, Truth
or Consequences - Is Voir Dire Really a Waste of Time?, 43 WASH. ST. B.
NEws, May 1989, at 11 ("[E]xperienced trial advocates will admit there is
abuse of the jury selection process by attorneys... [who are] guilty of taking
improper advantage of the voir dire procedure."); Michael J. Saks, The Limits
of Scientific Jury Selection: Ethical and Empirical, 17 JuRiMEmrcs 3, 6
(1976) (noting that the goal of "Scientific Jury Selection" is to use social
science research to help attorneys select jurors with favorable attitudes towards
their client's case).
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what goes on in jury selection rooms in New York State Supreme
35
Court every day.
If we must have juries sitting on civil cases, let us at least concede that juries are going to be biased and maybe ask them no
questions, just bring them in and say to the first twelve, "You are
the jury." 36 That is an anathema, I am sure, to a lot of practicing
lawyers in this country. However, when you actually think about
it, it is probably closer to the essential essence of what we were
trying to achieve with the jury system in the first place. You
might say that six people are not going to be representative of
one's peers in a particular circumstance. 37 Let us put twenty on
the jury or fifteen on the jury. By seating a larger number of jurors, maybe you can flatten out the effect of any biases. 3 8 Then
you might say, "How do we get all these people to agree? We
will never reach a verdict." I say that is fine. If they are going to
decide the question on a preponderance of the evidence, let us say

35. In New York civil practice, the attorneys conduct the questioning of
prospective jurors during the voir dire. The judge will only intervene if there
is some unresolvable dispute between the parties. See SIEGEL, supra note 32.
36. See Hon. James D. Heiple, Panel 7wo: Innovations for Improving
Courtroom Communications and Views from Appellate Courts, 68 IND. L.J.
1061, 1078 (1993) ("If we took the first twelve people out of the box... and

swore the jurors in and went on with the trial, we might have a representative
jury."); see, e.g., Eric Wertheim, Note, Anonymous Juries, 54 FORDHAM L.
REV. 981, 988 n.44 (1986) ("[S]ome attorneys accept the first 12 prospective
jurors without examination. ... " (citing V. HALE STARR & MARK
MCCORMICK, JURY SELECTION 75, 223 (1985))).
37. Hans Zeisel ....
And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the
FederalJury, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 710, 716 (1971) (concluding that surveys
compiled demonstrate that the smaller the jury, the less the chances are of
compiling a jury which truly represents "all conunity views").
38. Edward P. Schwartz & Warren F. Schwartz, Decision Making by
Juries Under Unanimity and Supermajority Voting Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 775,

807 (1991) (concluding that "if we are concerned with jury verdicts reflecting
the preferences of the average member of society as closely as possible, larger
juries are certain to achieve this result better than smaller juries."); Zeisel,
supra note 37, at 716 (stating that larger juries better represent "all community
views").
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the decision can be made by a preponderance of the jurors. 39
Maybe only seventy-five percent need agree on a verdict.
Other problems with the jury system relate to the ability of juries simply to understand what is being said to them. 40 Last
night, I was in the city at a meeting of a products liability
committee that I sit on. On our committee we have a number of
prominent lawyers, including a judge of the New York Supreme
Court who has recently retired. He had been on the bench for
twenty years. He concedes that in complex cases, juries often

reach decisions which have little or nothing to do with the facts,
and have nothing to do with the law. They often reach decisions,

in my view, on their impression of the lawyer and whether they
trust him or not. I think the opportunity that is given to lawyers
to speak to jurors in jury selection rooms is abused. 4 1 It is like a
39. See generally Schwartz & Schwartz, supra note 38 (advocating the
supermajority approach to jury verdicts).
40. See Cecil et al., supra note 29, at 753 (noting a research study of the
American jury system which revealed that some jurors were "'out of their
league'" in understanding judicial instructions); William W. Schwarzer,
Communicating with Juries: Problems and Remedies, 69 CAL. L. REv. 731,
731-32 (1981). Schwarzer states that:
[I]ssues submitted to jurors are often technical and foreign to their
experience... [making it] much more difficult for juries to return
informed verdicts... [and that] [p]revailing practices of instructing
juries are often so archaic and unrealistic that even in relatively simple
cases what the jurors hear is little more than legal mumbo jumbo to
them.
I&; see also Elizabeth F. Loftus & Edithe Greene, Twelve Angry People: The
Collective Mind of the Jury, 84 CoLuhM. L. REV. 1425, 1431-33 (1984)

(reviewing REID HASTm Er AL., INSIDE THE JURY (1983) (discussing juror
confusion and the different types of errors that jurors make)).
41. See Dale W. Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study,
38 S. CAL. L. REv. 503, 522 (1965) ("[A]bout eighty per cent of the lawyers'
voir dire time was spent indoctrinating, only twenty per cent in sifting out the
favorable from the unfavorable veniremen.") (emphasis in original); Joseph F.
Flynn, PrejudicialPublicity in Criminal Trials: Bringing Sheppard v. Maxwell
into the Nineties, 27 NEw ENG. L. REv., 857, 872 (1993) ("[A]buses of voir
dire are common, with the result being that the ultimate goal, an impartial
jury, becomes less important than the skill of the respective attorneys to skew
the bias their way."); Hastie, supra note 34, at 725 ("Extended attorneyconducted voir dire procedures are ineffective at winnowing out prejudiced
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beauty show. It is the opportunity for the attorney to make these

42
jurors his friend, and objectivity goes out the window.

Turning now to the question of precision in the law, as a defense-minded lawyer, I said to you that surprises are not what I
like. I come from a different tradition originally. I practiced law
in South Africa for many years before I came to the United
States. 43 Legislation in South Africa, forgetting the political con-

tent, is extremely precise and well-drafted. I am delighted to hear
that Professors Twerski and Henderson are attempting to bring

about precision in drafting of the law, here, as it applies to section 402A.

It is mind boggling to me, as a practicing attorney, and to
many of my colleagues, that here in the United States we have
hundreds of thousands of lawyers. 44 We have lawyers crawling
all over Washington, and yet the laws that come out of our legislature are a complete mess. First, they are vague in and of themselves. Then they are passed on to a regulatory agency which

proceeds to make them even more vague. 45 It is great for the lejurors, subject to abuse by attorneys, lower public regard for the jury system,
and are expensive.").
42. See Broeder, supra note 41, at 522 ("[T]he lawyers' image of voir dire
- not so much a place to screen out 'undesirables' as a place to argue, to
prepare the jurors for particular items of evidence or rules of law, and to
ingratiate themselves with the jurors.") (emphasis in original); Flynn, supra
note 41, at 872 ("many attorneys attempt to use voir dire to educate and
establish a rapport with the jurors...").
43. Mr. Crofton practiced law in South Africa for nine years.
44. As of 1991, there were approximately 744,000 lawyers employed in
the United States. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 392 (112th ed. 1992).
45. See generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Community Reinvestment Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 291,
295 (1993) (stating that the Community Reinvestment Act rating system is
vague and imprecise as set out in the regulations enacted); David Mellinkoff,
The Myth of Precision and the Law Dictionary, 31 UCLA L. REV. 423, 439
(1983) (noting that there is such little precision in the law that inconsistencies
in language often exist within the same statute); E.F. Roberts, JudicialNotice:
An Essay Concerning Human Misunderstanding, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1435,
1442 (1986) ("Any number of laws enacted by the Congress are so vague that
the administrator of them must actually make basic decisions involving the
strategy as to how whole programs should be implemented."); Richard B.
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gal profession because we will fight about problems in the laws
from here to the next century. It is very bad from a societal point
of view. 46 I am, therefore, delighted to hear about the current
effort towards precision. Precision will allow judges to make decisions where the facts are plainly not in dispute. Summary
judgment standards from a procedural standpoint may be made
less stringent than they are today. Currently, any whiff of a factual dispute avoids summary judgment, and bear in mind that a
whiff of a factual dispute in products liability cases is often introduced by a paid expert. I have had cases where no one has argued
about the basic facts of the case until we moved for summary
judgment, when out of the woods comes a paid expert who raises
an issue of fact and summary judgment is denied. That is the type
of procedural problem that one is faced with in practice. Thank
you very much.

Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and PrivateRights, 95 HARV.
L. REv. 1193, 1209 (1982) ("[C]ongress, in writing vague or general laws,

relies on agency specialization to particularize and narrow statutory norms.").
46. See James Lindgren, Defining Pornography, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
1153, 1181 (1993) ("Vague laws offend several important values: they deny
people fair notice that certain conduct is forbidden, they inadequately define

crimes prior to commission, and they permit 'arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.'" (citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974);
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972); Papachristou v.
City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972))); Ronald D. Rotunda, The
Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Brief Introductory Analysis of the Congressional

Response to JudicialInterpretation,68 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 923, 938 (1993)
("When Congress writes unnecessarily vague laws, it is not solving problems
but creating them.").
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